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Abstract 
Despite the impressive amount of empirical research on lobbying, a fundamental question 
remains overlooked. How do interest groups choose to lobby different sides of an issue? We 
argue that how groups choose sides is a function of firm-level economic activity. By studying a 
highly salient regulatory issue, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, and using a novel 
dataset of lobbying, we reveal that a group’s main economic sector matters most. Firms 
operating in finance and retail face unique costs and are incentivized to lobby against the GDPR. 
However, these groups are outgunned by a large, heterogeneous group of firms with superior 
lobbying firepower on the other side of the issue. 
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 2 
A central concern of interest group scholars is the question of how interest groups align on 
different sides of a lobbying battle. Specifically, are interest group mobilization patterns skewed 
or biased toward one set of interests and not another? This question, while relevant in various 
lobbying systems,i is particularly salient in the case of the European Union (EU). EU interest 
group scholars have long characterized the EU lobbying system in terms of elite pluralism, 
where business interests are systematically advantaged over citizen groups and NGOs (Mazey 
and Richardson 1997; Streeck and Schmittter 1991; for a competing view see Eising 2007). 
Indeed, empirical surveys of the EU interest group population consistently show how business 
interests are better represented in Brussels than their not-for-profit counterparts (Berkhout et 
al. 2015; Berkhout and Lowery 2008; Broscheid and Coen 2007; Messer, Berkhout, and Lowery 
2010; Rasmussen and Carroll 2014; Wonka et al. 2010). Rather than being fair and equal, ‘one of 
the most consistent findings in interest group research’ is that interests are rarely, if ever, 
aligned evenly on different sides of an issue and that lobbying patterns in the EU tend to be 
highly skewed (Berkhout et al. 2015, 12). 
The issue of skewed alignment has given rise to an impressive amount of empirical 
research. Scholars take up the fundamental task of mapping out the EU lobbying footprint by 
attempting to establish the population of interest groups active in Brussels (Berkhout and 
Lowery 2008; Greenwood 1997; Kohler-Koch 1997; Wonka et al. 2010). Others, assessing a host 
of structural and actor-level variables, examine when and why interest groups mobilize as well 
as how ‘diverse’ (i.e., how many different types of groups mobilize) this set of actors tends to be 
(Berkhout and Lowery 2008; Broscheid and Coen 2007; Chalmers 2015; Messer, Berkhout, and 
Lowery 2010; Rasmussen and Carroll 2014). Scholars have also linked alignment patterns to 
interest group success in lobbying, showing how success is a function of the aggregate resources 
(e.g., finances, personnel, information, and expertise) of interest groups aligned on competing 
sides of an issue (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Klüver 2013). Finally, a recent contribution by a 
group of leading interest group scholars examines the question of alignment from the 
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perspective of what an ‘unbiased’ lobbying system would look like in an ideal interest group 
system (Lowery et al. 2015).  
There is thus no paucity of research on the question of alignment. The existing 
scholarship is impressive and has led to some cumulative findings about the EU lobbying 
system. Nevertheless, we argue that one fundamental question still tends to be overlooked. 
Specifically, what factors determine lobbying sides in the first place? Where scholars have 
sought to map out and explain mobilization patterns, they have occluded the alignment of 
groups on different sides of an issue. And where scholars have painstakingly coded group 
alignment on different sides of an issue, these data are used as independent variables explaining 
some other phenomenon (e.g., group success). The main contribution of this analysis is that we 
take alignment patterns (understood in terms of lobbying sides, or how groups align either in 
support of a policy or in opposition to it) as our dependent variable. Our central goal is to 
discern the factors that explain alignment patterns assessed at the level of the individual 
interest group and examined with regard to a specific EU policy proposal.  
The one study, to our knowledge, that does take alignment patterns as a dependent 
variable, Bunea (2015), explains alignment in terms of formal coordination amongst interest 
groups via their membership in national and European associations. While presenting a 
compelling argument, one shortcoming of this study, and something that we seek to address 
here, is its perfunctory treatment of factors explaining alignment that are unrelated to explicit 
coordination. This includes how alignment results from interest groups sharing similarities in 
terms of group organization structure or type. While these factors are included as part of our 
analysis, we advance on Bunea (2015) by explaining interest group alignment not only in terms 
of what groups are (e.g., group type) but also in terms of what groups do (e.g., their activity 
across different economic sectors). Importantly, and as we discuss in greater detail below, we 
find that what interest groups do tends to matter considerably more than what groups are.  
 Our analysis of alignment begins with the observation that policy context matters. Each 
lobbying battle is over a set of specific issues that, in turn, impact lobbying behaviour, lobbying 
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strategies, the extent of group influence, and more importantly patterns of interest group 
alignment (Klüver, Braun, and Beyers 2015).ii To hold the policy context constant we have opted 
to narrow the empirical focus of this analysis to lobbying on one specific, highly salient, and 
recent EU regulatory issue: namely, the proposed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 
Aimed at shoring up critical weaknesses in the existing 1995 Data Protection Directive – like 
suspending the current EU-U.S. Safe Harbour Agreement that allows American companies to 
handle European citizens’ data without using the EU’s stringent data protection rules – the 
proposed regulation ‘has been one of the most lobbied pieces of European legislation in 
European Union history’ (Long, 2014: 1).iii Indeed, there is widespread conjecture that the GDPR 
has been subject to excessive and undue lobbying pressure levelled at weakening the new 
regulation and, in particular, shaping it in the interests of a small number of very powerful 
private-sector firms (see Anonymous, 2013, p. 180). A high profile scandal in 2012 is a case in 
point: several Members of the European Parliament were caught ‘copying-and-pasting’ industry 
policy requests directly into legislative amendments for the GDPR (for an overview see Clark, 
2013). The scandal captured news headlines, and highlighted the lobbying power exerted by 
U.S. Internet and retail giants, like Amazon and eBay. 
This article seeks to explain interest groups’ preference alignment for the GDPR, either 
lobbying for or against it. Our main argument is that interest group preference alignment is a 
function of industry-specific costs related to regulatory change. Generally speaking, there is a 
surprising paucity of research seeking to explain interest group preferences. (Newman 2010, 
1289). The work that does exist tends to focus on national institutional contexts (where groups 
operate) and interest groups’ permanent characteristics, whether business associations or 
NGOs (what groups are). While presenting a compelling picture, we argue that these 
explanations only take us so far in understanding how groups align on different sides of a 
lobbying battle, expressing support or opposition for some new proposal. In addition to ‘where 
groups operate’ and ‘what groups are’, we argue that preferences are a function of ‘what groups 
do’. In specific terms, support for or opposition to a new legislative proposal is related to the 
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immediate costs that regulatory change imposes on a specific industry. Industries that 
anticipate immediate cost increases will lobby to oppose change or will lobby in favour of 
retaining the status quo, while industries that anticipate costs decreases or no increases will 
lobby to support change. Our argument, while straightforward, marks an important advance on 
existing work. First, we suggest that industry costs are not country specific, but rather have a 
transnational character. While country institutions may moderate preferences, industry actors 
express preferences that are not circumscribed by state boundaries.  Second, explanations that 
rely on permanent interest group characteristics to explain group preferences, making a key 
distinction between business and NGOs, occlude important intra-business differences. Our 
explanation takes these differences seriously, focusing on the different ‘costs’ that specific 
industries face in light of regulatory change.  
 The basis of our analysis is a novel dataset derived from interest group lobbying on the 
European Commission’s GDPR consultations. This consists of lobbying positions taken by 279 
individual interest groups on three separate GDPR consultations over a three-year period 
(2009-2011). Statistical analyses reveal several key findings. We find some evidence that 
preference alignment is a function of industry specific costs. In particular, groups representing 
the interests of the financial and retail sectors are much more likely to wage a trenchant defence 
of the status quo than other sectors. Both sectors routinely handle vast amounts of sensitive 
personal data, are the primary targets of cybercrime and data breaches, and also stand to face 
high fines for failing to comply with the new EU rules. As such, groups representing finance and 
retail are highly incentivized to lobby against the GDPR. Nevertheless, we also find these effects 
are not consistent across other sectors that are susceptible to such fines. Instead, lobbying in 
support of the GDPR is far more widespread and involves a large, heterogeneous group of 
interests. In other words, when it comes to choosing sides, in this case lobbying is highly 
skewed toward support for the GDPR. These conditions, we argue, are conducive to substantial 
policy change and help explain why the defence of the status quo, commonly a strong position 
from which to lobby, failed in this case. 
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Explaining patterns of support and opposition for the GDPR  
The EU has long acted as a global standard setter for Internet privacy and data protection. Its 
1995 Data Protection Directive enshrined in law the individual’s right to control the collection, 
dissemination, and storage of personal information. Perhaps most innovative, the Directive, 
through its ‘extraterritorial clause’, applies equally to personal data disseminated across EU 
member state borders as well as data shared with third party countries. Indeed, the Directive 
has become the de facto international standard with more than 30 countries now following the 
EU’s approach (De Hert et al., 2012: 131; Newman, 2008: 104). Since 2012, efforts to strengthen 
the Directive and increase its scope and power have been underway. The proposed General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) increases legal harmonization across the EU’s member 
states, strengthens monitoring and compliance mechanisms, closes legal loopholes that allow 
for the existence of ‘data havens’, and even suspends the current EU-U.S. Safe Harbour 
Agreement (Gyves, 2015; Voss, 2014). For Kuner (2012), the new Regulation marks nothing less 
than a ‘Copernican revolution’ in EU data protection law.  
 The importance and scope of the GDPR for both EU member state and third countries 
help explain intense lobbying efforts to shape the new Regulation. Nevertheless, despite 
considerable conjecture about lobbying on the GDPR, there is as yet very little scholarly work 
addressing this issue. The scant work that has been done can be categorised into two broad 
explanations, one related to differences across countries and their existing institutions, and the 
other related to differences among different types of interest groups.   
 First, scholars have long acknowledged that market integration in Europe creates new 
sets of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, both inside and outside of the Union. For EU members, the 
Europeanization literature suggests that when there are changes at the European level, how 
closely these changes fit with what already exists at the domestic level defines the member 
state’s reaction to the new policy (Börzel et al., 2003; Ladrech, 2010; Risse et al., 2001). Poor fit 
implies strong adaptational pressure while good fit implies weak pressure. Where there is 
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strong pressure, we would expect more interest group resistance and activism towards the 
proposed measure. Adaptational pressures are also felt by non-EU member states. Powerful 
states can seek to limit adjustment costs, ensuring that new (international) arrangements 
correspond as closely as possible to their pre-existing national regulatory frameworks (see 
Simmons 2001). More often, however, new EU standards often ‘forces global competitors […] to 
meet similar requirements at home’ (Vogel, 2012: 8). Once again, pressure corresponds to the 
gap between existing third-country domestic rules from EU rules. 
In the particular area of data protection, the fit/misfit between EU and third country 
rules has been used to explain the considerable resistance of the U.S. government and U.S.-based 
firms toward the EU’s 1995 Directive. The Directive favoured a top-down, government-led 
approach, while the U.S. drew on its longstanding tradition of self-regulation and limited 
government involvement. While in Europe privacy is considered a fundamental right to be 
protected by the state, the U.S. ‘prefers a more market-oriented approach to data protection’ 
(Bessette et al., 2001). These differences across the two systems translated into adjustment 
costs that were unfavourable to U.S. firms. To adopt EU rules would have effectively imposed a 
high ‘regulatory tax’ on companies accustomed to less stringent rules (Bessette et al., 2001: 71). 
The resulting Safe Harbour compromise applied EU rules to U.S. firms but via a self-regulatory 
approach. Since first being introduced in 1998, Safe Harbour has been the subject of much 
criticism, with several studies revealing serious compliance issues of many U.S. firms handling 
personal data but not meeting the EU’s minimum requirements (European Commission, 2002a, 
2004; Rossi, 2014: 70f).  
A second explanation for variation in interest group lobbying demands is related to 
interest groups’ permanent characteristics. Most importantly, different types of interest group 
are expected to have certain regulatory preferences based on the costs imposed by a new 
regulation (Dur and Mateo 2016).  A central distinction is made between so-called diffuse 
interest groups (like cause groups and NGOs) and concentrated interest groups (like business 
associations and firms). Diffuse groups, insofar as they represent the interests of broad 
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segments of society and lack a well-delineated constituency (Baroni et al. 2014, 145; Beyers 
2002, 589, 2004, 216; Walker 1991), have ‘diffuse’ preferences that tend to focus on ‘general 
principles like equity, social justice, and environmental protection’(Dür and De Bie vre 2007, 
82). Concentrated interests, by contrast, represent narrow, socio-economically defined and 
concentrated constituencies (Beyers 2004, 216), and hence articulate industry-specific 
preferences, most often articulated in the form of expert and technical information about policy 
proposals (Bouwen 2004). In broader terms, diffuse interests tend to express preferences that 
advocate on behalf of the public good, while concentrated interest express preferences that 
serve their own narrow interests. How do these assumptions work in the context of regulatory 
issues and, specifically, the GDPR? 
The collection, storage and use of personal data is big business and the GDPR will change 
the way this business is done, striking a new balance between economic winners and losers. 
Former European Commission Vice President in charge of fundamental rights Vivienne Redding 
puts this in perspective: ‘the estimated value of EU citizen’s data was €315 billion in 2011’ and 
‘has the potential to grow to nearly €1 trillion annually in 2020’ (cited in Voss, 2014: 19). 
Private-sector interests therefore have a clear incentive to ‘acquire as much information about 
their customers as possible’ as this ‘information-gathering facilitates marketing and sales 
strategies’ (Drezner, 2007: 103). In protecting an individual’s right to manage their own 
personal data and imposing more stringent rules on firms seeking to profit from the use of this 
personal data, the new regulation clearly presents different costs for different types of interest 
groups. Specifically, there is good reason to expect a marked difference in support for the GDPR 
between concentrated interest groups (like individual firms and business associations) and 
those groups representing diffuse interests (like NGOs, consumer protection groups, and citizen 
groups). Indeed, for concentrated interests more stringent regulations can set a limit to 
potential earnings from the use of personal data. According to the new regulation, large 
companies with over 250 employers will need to take on the additional cost of employing an in-
house ‘data protection officer’ with expertise in data protection law (GDPR, Article 35). Further, 
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more stringent mechanisms for ensuring compliance to the GDPR could see firms facing fines of 
over 100,000,000 euro for instances of non-compliance. Finally, the GDPR has been criticized 
for doing little to streamline the protection of ‘employee data’, which for most companies 
constitutes their ‘biggest database’, and hence biggest challenge (Mooney, 2013). The Brussels 
European Employee Relations Group, a Brussels-based think tank, estimates that ‘the employee 
related data provisions alone could add €3 billion each year, in additional costs to business’ 
(Ibid). The GDPR clearly imposes high costs to private sector interests. By contrast, NGOs, 
including consumer protection groups and citizen groups, do not face any of these increased 
costs. What is more, NGOs are well positioned to represent the ‘public interest’ when it comes to 
protecting personal data and should therefore welcome the new regulation.  
 
Industry-specific costs and lobbying preferences 
The national institutional context and assumptions related to interest group type take us some 
distance in understanding group preferences. However, we argue that this is only part of the 
story. In addition to ‘where groups operate’ and ‘what groups are’, we argue that lobbying 
preferences are largely shaped by ‘what groups do’. In other words, lobbying preferences are 
shaped by industry-specific factors that transcend the specifics of national institutional context 
and assumptions about the permanent characteristics captured by ‘group type’. Different 
industries are differently impacted by regulatory change, imposing higher immediate costs on 
some industries, and lower (or no) immediate costs on others. These costs may be mediated by 
national institutions, but tend to operate primarily at a transnational level. Further, we 
acknowledge that there is a clear overlap between concentrated interest groups and groups that 
represent industry preferences. However, our argument about industry-specific costs presents 
a far more nuanced picture of how costs are distributed not only across concentrated and 
diffuse groups, but across different industries within the umbrella category of concentrated 
interest groups. As such, our approach marks an advance on existing studies.  
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 How do industry-specific differences translate into differences in lobbying preferences? 
First, it important to note that a sector-specific explanation of firm-level preferences is already 
commonplace in scholarship explaining global trade patterns. For instance, the well-established 
Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowments theory explains support for free trade as a function of the 
perceived costs and benefits of trade policies to specific firms in different sectors. Firms 
operating in sectors with abundant endowments stand to gain more and therefore offer more 
support than firms in less well-endowed sectors.  
Internet governance is far less static than more traditional economic sectors, like 
resource extraction or manufacturing. As such, when it comes to the Internet and the use of 
personal data, it is more difficult to assess differences in terms of factor endowments. Newman 
(2010) makes an important contribution to this line of inquiry. Examining firms’ preferences for 
earlier attempts to regulate the use of private data, Newman argues that preferences are 
determined by a firm’s ‘stock of information assets’. Firms that are rich in information assets 
will treat information as a private good and will therefore support efforts to limit information 
access. In other words, they will support more stringent data protection regulation. Firms that 
have few information assets will treat information as a public good and will resist efforts to 
limit information access (Newman 2010, 1287). Newman’s approach marks an important 
advance on existing studies, especially on research that relies heavily on a national institutional 
context explanation. In particular, Newman stresses the potentially transnational nature of firm 
preferences. However, Newman’s research limits itself to an examination of the financial 
services sector and examines variation in ‘information assets’ by comparing countries with a 
large number of large banks (a proxy for a greater amount of information assets) versus 
countries with more small and medium sized banks (a proxy for fewer information assets). 
While focusing on industry-specific costs, Newman’s research is constrained in what it can tell 
us about variation in information assets across different industries. 
Anecdotal evidence from recent reports is able to shed some light on industry specific 
differences, examining how IT firms, like Facebook and Twitter, operating in sectors that 
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presumably stand to lose the most from the new regulation, behave differently when it came to 
lobbying on the GDPR. First, evidence from recent lobbying campaigns places these specific 
firms at the heart of recent lobbying efforts (Clark, 2013). After all, social media represent a 
massive and relatively untapped source of valuable information on personal and consumer 
habits. Recent studies also suggest that financial industry firms as well as retailers will also be 
hit hard by the GDPR (European Data Protection Supervisor, 2014; Long, 2014; Rogers et al., 
2015). Financial industry firms and retailers host a vast wealth of information on sensitive bank 
account data, including credit and debit card purchases as well as data stored in data payment 
systems. In handling ‘billions of financial records and transactions’ daily, the finance and retail 
sectors are at risk of cyber-attacks, data breaches and identity theft. A 2014 report on data 
breaches by industry type shows that data breaches have not only increased by nearly 49% 
since the previous year, but that most breaches occur in the financial services sector (about 
12% of all data breaches) and, in a close second place, in the retail sector (Breach Level Index, 
2014). These increased occurrences of data breaches would constitute a lack of compliance 
under the GDPR. Drawing on this knowledge, a recent survey of European professionals had 
many experts predicting that a financial firm would be the first to face non-compliance fines 
imposed by the European Commission after the GDPR takes effect (Dunn, 2015; Green, 2015). 
Taking these insights together, we posit our central hypothesis:  
Industries facing the largest potential immediate costs related to a new regulation will 
oppose the new regulation while those facing fewer or no immediate costs will support it.  
 
Research Design 
In what follows we will provide details concerning data collection and operationalization for 
our hypothesis, alternative explanations, as well as for several control variables. We begin with 
a discussion of the dependent variable. 
 
Lobbying Preferences  
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Data for this analysis is largely derived from the European Commission’s public consultations 
on the GDPR.iv The Commission is mandated to consult widely on important legislative 
measures, inviting a broad range of individuals and groups to weigh in on new policies or policy 
changes (European Commission, 2002b). The GDPR was no exception, with the Commission 
holding three consultations over a 32-month period starting in 2009 and ending in 2011. This 
includes: (1) ‘Consultation on the legal framework for the fundamental right to protection of 
personal data’; (2) ‘Consultation on the future European Union (EU) - United States of America 
(US) international agreement on personal data protection and information sharing for law 
enforcement purposes’; and (3) ‘Consultation on the Commission's comprehensive approach to 
personal data protection in the European Union’.v  
Consultation data are useful insofar as they provide an accurate picture of lobbying 
patterns on the GDPR, including which specific groups lobbied and what their preferences were 
regarding the new regulation. Consultation data is now a relatively well-established approach to 
assessing interest group lobbying patterns as well as lobbying influence. Lobbying patterns 
evinced in consultation participation offer several empirical advantages for research. Namely, 
barriers to participation are low since lobbying briefs are submitted via an online tool, ensuring 
that the lobbying is not skewed toward those groups with superior resources (e.g., concentrated 
interest groups) or privileged access to decision-makers (e.g., the social dialogue mechanism). 
Second, consultation documents give us direct insight into the lobbying preferences of 
individual groups on specific policy issues. We code Lobbying preferences as they are articulated 
in the GDPR consultation documents on an ordinal scale where 1 = preference for less stringent 
regulation, 2 = preference for retaining existing 1995 EU directive (status quo), and 3 = 
preference for more stringent regulation (i.e., for the new GDPR). This approach to coding 
preferences is based on Yackee and Yackee (2006). However, rather than coding preferences for 
more or less regulation, we adapt Yackee and Yackee to capture preferences for degrees of 
stringency. A similar approach is used in Young and Pagliari (2017).vi To ensure data quality, we 
engaged in a test for inter-coder reliability (with two additional coders each coding twenty 
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randomly selected consultation documents from the complete dataset) and can report a 
Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.755 (for nominal data). 
 
Industry-Specific Costs 
Our hypothesis predicts that an interest group’s lobbying preference is a function of the specific 
costs regulatory change would impose on certain industries. Some industries will face higher 
costs than others. A central challenge of operationalising this hypothesis is to accurately and 
reliably pinpoint industries that stand to face the highest costs with the implementation of the 
GDPR and differentiate these from other, less threatened industries. Some industry-specific 
differences were already intimated above, especially as they relate to the immediate costs 
associated with non-compliance. In other words, certain industries, due to the nature of their 
work and their access to and use of data, are simply more likely to find compliance to the new 
GDPR guidelines more difficult than others. Our approach to pinpointing these industries is to 
use data from the Breach Level Index, a centralised database that records publically disclosed 
data-breaches of differing severity (including identity theft, financial access, account access, 
existential data, and nuisance) across the globe and spanning 2013 to 2017.vii The Breach Level 
Index also disaggregates data breaches by industry, indicating the specific industries for which 
breaches pose the most formidable challenge. Aggregating data from 2013 to 2017, the Index 
provides a list of the most impacted industries based on the total percentage of breaches over 
the four year period: technology (including social media) (43%), retail (9%), financial services 
(including insurance) (7%), entertainment (5%), health care (3%), education (2%), and 
hospitality (1%).viii  To categorise each of the 279 interest groups that lobbied on the GDPR in 
one of these industry categories required several steps. First, we coded each interest group by 
their main industry activities according to the International Standard Industrial Classification 
scheme (ISIC rev. 4), a United Nations system for classifying diverse economic sector activities.ix 
This approach to coding is consistent with a growing body of interest group research (for 
example, see Beyers et al. 2014). The results of our coding are outlined in Table 1.  
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
Next, we used this ISIC coding to generate industry sector dummy variables for those industries 
identified in the Breach Level dataset: Finance (financial service activities, except insurance and 
pension funding; insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social 
security; activities auxiliary to financial service and insurance activities); Retail (retail trade, 
except of motor vehicles and motorcycles); Technology (telecommunications; manufacture of 
computer, electronic and optical products); Health (human health activities); Entertainment 
(motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and music 
publishing activities; Programming and broadcasting activities); and Hospitality (travel agency, 
tour operator, reservation service and related activities). The reference category for all of these 
binary indicators is based on the industry categories not identified by the Breach Level Index 
(and hence those industries facing fewer potential costs related to the new GDPR rules).  
 
Alternative Explanations 
 To get a sense of the relative explanatory power of our hypothesis, we also examine the two 
main alternative explanations discussed above: country-level institutional context, and interest 
group type. 
 First, differences related to national institutional context was operationalised by 
focusing on each countries’ relative adjustment costs vis-à-vis the GDPR and especially each 
countries’ position on the status quo, namely the 1995 directive. First, the US would face 
considerable adjustment costs with the new GDPR insofar as American firms were protected 
under the Safe Harbour agreement. Using the list of all US organisations that fall under this 
agreement we created a dummy variable (Safe Harbour) for all organisations in our data set that 
operated under Safe Harbour.x  
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In addition to Safe Harbour, there are also some important differences among EU 
member states when it came to transposing the 1995 directive into national law. In particular, 
France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands were delayed in the process of transposition and 
even faced legal challenges levelled by the European Court of Justice.xi While all five of these 
member states ended up transposing the directive into national law, the fact that these states 
were late compliers suggest some level of adjustment costs in each instance. We coded each 
interest group in our dataset first according to their country of origin and then we created a 
dummy variable, Late compliers, for groups from France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands. 
 Second, we control for interest group permanent characteristics, or, in other words, 
interest group type. To this end we coded each interest group that lobbied on the three GDPR 
consultations in terms of ‘interest group type’ using data and categories of interest groups 
derived from the European Commission’s Transparency Register.xii Specifically, coding required 
matching the 279 groups that participated in GDPR consultations to data from the Commission’s 
Register. The categories of interest group type used in the Register include trade, business and 
professional associations, companies, NGOs, trade unions, law firms, think tanks, consultancies, 
public authorities, and public / mixed entities. An overview of this coding can be found in the 
Online Appendix. Using these data, we re-coded interest group type into two categorical 
indicators: first, one indicator for Concentrated Interest Groups (a category including companies, 
trade business and professional associations, professional consultancies, law firms, and self-
employed consultants); second, an indicator for Diffuse Interest Groups (NGOS, cause groups, 
citizen groups, religious organisations).  
 
Control Variables 
First, we include a control variable for Public Salience, or public awareness of the GDPR. Greater 
public awareness of a given legislative proposal can have the effect of shaping interest group 
lobbying preferences. When awareness is high, it brings lobbying debates and lobbying 
practices into the light of day and might make lobbying to oppose legislative change more 
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difficult. This is especially the case when these changes entail a move toward more stringent 
regulation. We measure Public Salience using data from the Special Eurobarometer 359, Attitudes 
on Data Protection and Electronic Identify in the European Union.xiii  Specifically, we recorded 
individual responses for the question: ‘How important or not is it for you to have the same 
rights and protections over your personal information regardless of the EU country in which it 
is collected and processed?’ Higher levels of support indicate higher levels of support for the 
harmonisation of EU data protection rules, as proposed in the GDRP. Data for Public Awareness 
are measured at the country-level.  
 A further control variable is related to the ‘level of interest’ for each interest group in 
our dataset: either European Interest or National Interest. In general terms, interest groups with 
European-level interests could be expected to demand further European integration and 
regulatory harmonisation than those with National-level interests, who tend to be more 
reluctant to see power shift from national governments to the EU-level. These insights lead to a 
specific expectation with regard to the link between level of lobbying and preferences 
concerning the GDPR. Namely, the 1995 Data Protection rules took the form of an EU directive, 
leaving considerable discretion in the interpretation and implementation to national 
governments. By contrast, the proposed GDPR is a regulation, shifting more power to the EU 
and promising a much greater level of harmonization and compliance across member states 
(see Hix et al., 2011, p. 78).  
Finally, we include a control variable for interest group staff: the number of people 
employed by an interest organisation involved in lobbying activities. Interest groups with more 
staff have certain informational and strategic advantages over other groups. They tend to be 
better informed, are better able to engage in meaningful lobbying activities, and are also better 
connected to other interest groups. Staff-related advantages do not have a determinist effect on 
an interest group’s lobbying preferences. However, these advantages may allow an interest 
group to overcome or defray adjustments costs captured in our variables Safe Harbour and Late 
compliers, as well as expected differences related to interest group type. Data are derived from 
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the European Union Transparency Register. Descriptive statistics for all indicators used in this 
analysis can be found in the Online Appendix.  
 
Analysis 
To examine our central hypothesis, we test a series of multilevel regression analyses where we 
use random intercepts at the consultation and country levels as we expect lobbying preferences 
to vary across the specifics of each consultation and also be shaped by country-level factors that 
are otherwise not captured by our other indicators. As our dependent variable, Lobbying 
preferences, is measured on an ordinal scale (taking three ordered values) we estimate models 
using ordered logistic regression analysis. Results for five regression models are presented in 
Table 2. To test the robustness of our results, we also estimate the same models using logistic 
regression analysis (and a re-coded version of our dependent variable) and multinomial logistic 
regression analysis (using our original dependent variable but ignoring the ordering of its 
values). Results of these robustness tests are consistent with our main findings, and are 
presented in full in the appendix.xiv Model 1 is a baseline model; Model 2 adds indicators to test 
assumptions about national institutional context; Model 3 tests assumptions about the 
differences between interest group types (concentrated versus diffuse): Model 4 tests our 
hypothesis about industry specific costs; and finally Model 5 tests all indicators together in a 
single model. Importantly, due to a lack of data, two sectors, namely health and hospitality, were 
dropped from this analysis. Finally, a test for multicollinearity among our independent variables 
revealed no issues.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
To begin with the broader context, our regression results provide some interesting and 
unexpected results related to our control variables. First, we find no significant differences 
related to Staff or Public Salience. Having more lobbying staff may afford interest groups certain 
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lobbying advantages, but it does not shape their preferences in a meaningful way.  Similarly, 
public awareness about harmonising data protection rules across the EU does little to shape 
lobbying preferences. Second, we do find that having European-level interests matters. 
However, contrary to our expectations, interest groups representing European-level interests 
are more likely to prefer the status quo, a finding that is consistent across all of our regression 
models. One explanation for this result is that having European-level interests does not 
categorically exclude groups that might oppose integration. A group’s interest in European-level 
lobbying may also be to lobby for less integration. This is essentially about the extent to which 
our indicator for ‘level of interest’ only captures groups that support integration. For instance, 
looking closely at the consultation data, some of these European-level interest groups are based 
in the financial sector, favouring the status quo. Similarly, in their consultation input, some 
European-level groups, like the European Privacy Association, comment on the implications of 
the GDPR both for citizens and multinational companies, while a ‘global-level’ group, Privacy 
International, focuses solely on citizens. 
Second, we find some support for alternative explanations. Specifically, our results 
suggest that national institutional factors shape lobbying preferences. As we can see in model 2, 
while Safe Harbour shows no significant differences in any of the models, interest groups from 
so-called Late complier countries (EU member states that were hesitant in the transposition of 
the 1995 Directive) tend to be more likely to support the GDPR. Figure 1 plots the marginal 
effects of Late compliers on Lobbying preferences. Not only is the probability of supporting the 
GDPR about 10% more likely for late compliers, but the tendency to support the status quo is 
about 20% lower. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
These findings challenge our expectation that interest groups in states facing high adjustment 
costs will oppose regulatory change and greater regulatory stringency. How did late compliers 
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become supporters of the new Regulation? One explanation is that these member states, having 
already capitulated on any sticking points regarding data protection rules, were now in a good 
position to adopt the new GDPR rules. In other words, the adjustment costs of implementing the 
1995 directive had already been paid. The widespread support for the GDPR in our data gives 
some purchase to this interpretation. In fact, interest groups from the so-called late compliers, 
namely France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands, show some of the highest levels of 
support for the GPDR compared to interest groups from other countries.  
Our expectations regarding interest group type were also partially meet. The results in 
model 3 for diffuse interest groups (NGOs, cause groups, and citizen groups) do not seem to 
have any significant bearing on lobbying preferences. Concentrated interests, however, like 
firms and business associations, are, as anticipated, more likely to oppose the GDPR than to 
support it. Again, plotting marginal effects for Concentrated interest groups (Figure 2) helps us 
interpret these results. We can see that the probability of supporting the GDPR is about 20% 
lower for Concentrated interest groups than other types of interest groups. At the same time, the 
probability of lobbying in defence of the status quo is about 10% higher.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Our results support the notion of a status quo bias in public policy. As Baumgartner et al. (2009, 
19f) explain, whatever power advantages concentrated interest groups have is already reflected 
in existing policies. If wealthy and powerful concentrated interests are ‘more prone to get what 
they want’ in terms of policy outcomes, ‘they should already have gotten what they wanted in 
previous rounds of the policy process.’ The implication is not only that public policy is shaped 
by powerful interests, but these same powerful interests have a considerable incentive to 
protect the status quo. And this is precisely what we are seeing in our results.  
Coming to our central argument, our regression results provide some support for our 
hypothesis. Results presented in models 4 and 5 suggest, indeed, that organisations operating in 
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several industries that are uniquely susceptible to data breaches do tend to be more likely to 
oppose the GDRP. Specifically, our results show a strong negative correlation between 
organisations in finance and retail and preferences concerning the GDPR. Results for technology 
and entertainment, however, show no significant differences in our models. Marginal effects for 
all four industries are plotted in Figure 3.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
We can see that the probability of lobbying to support the GDPR decreases considerably for 
organisations operating in finance and retail. Specifically, for finance, the odds of supporting the 
GDPR are about 30% lower than for other sectors; for retail the odds decrease by more than 
40%. We can also see that interest groups from these two same industries are more likely to 
lobby in defence of the status quo. For both finance and retail, the odds of supporting the status 
quo are about 40% higher compared to other sectors. These effects, however, are absent for the 
technology and entertainment sectors. 
These results confirm our expectations that firms from finance and retail are important 
handlers of personal data and, what is more, uniquely vulnerable to cyber-attacks and data 
breaches (Breach Level Index, 2014). This coupled with potential fines for non-compliance 
introduced in the GDPR explains why firms from both of these economic sectors would lobby to 
weaken the new regulation. To provide an example of these concerns from the final set of GDPR 
consultations, on the ‘European Commission’s comprehensive approach’, Eurofinas (the 
European Federation of Finance House Associations) argued strongly that the 1995 Directive 
was the ‘gold standard in data protection’, suggesting that it is premature for the European 
Commission to propose a new Regulation on the subject.xv On the principle of accountability, 
they ‘oppose any general obligation for the data controller to take appropriate measures to 
ensure and demonstrate data protection compliance’. On personal data breach notifications, 
they suggest that ‘there would be real difficulty in establishing thresholds for any obligation to 
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report personal data breach notifications due to the mix of different factors involved’ and 
believe that ‘Member State regulators are best placed to determine where notification or other 
action may be appropriate, on a case by case basis’. They similarly warn against the new rules 
on transparency, data ownership and right to be forgotten. As for profiling and risk assessment, 
they argue that ‘profiling should not mean risk assessment; risk assessment must not be 
prohibited, and lenders need to assess risk as part of their sound lending practices, which can 
help reduce levels of consumer overindebtedness’. In short, we can see a focused lobbying effort 
to undermine the conditions for enforcing GDPR fines for non-compliance. 
To take an example from retail, EMOTA, the European E-commerce and Mail Order 
Trade Association, supports the status quo, suggesting that the core principles of the 1995 
Directive are still valid and that ‘its technologically neutral character should be persevered’.xvi 
Specifying that ‘the comprehensive approach on personal data protection has raised several 
concerns among EMOTA’s members’, it warns that ‘specific actions suggested by the 
Commission may not be in the interest of a fair balance between economic interests and the 
protection of personal data’ and that ‘overly strict, static and bureaucratic data protection rules 
would have a detrimental impact on the economy’. For instance, on informed and free consent 
(getting permission before disclosing personal information), EMOTA warns that ‘changing to a 
requirement of explicit consent would be totally impractical and have huge economic 
implications, affecting all free media and threatening the whole advertising industry, the 
advertising financed creative content industry and small and medium sized companies’. EMOTA 
also argues that changing the current provisions would contradict the principle of free 
movement of personal data. Its overall recommendation is thus self-regulatory initiatives led by 
data controllers, proposing that ‘self-regulation represents an efficient tool to ensure effective 
application and implementation of the data’. These quotes portray the objection of the retail 
sector to increasing advertisement and bureaucratic costs. 
The picture painted above is one of focused resistance to the GDPR and a determined 
defence of the status quo (the 1995 Directive) by those working in finance and retail as well as 
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by concentrated interest groups more broadly speaking. However, this defence was not 
sustained across other industries and group types. Comparing lobbying demands in defence of 
the status quo versus support for the GDPR, as presented in Figure 4, helps explain why the 
GDPR passed into EU law.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Our data show that finance and retail stand alone in their preference for retaining the status 
quo. Other industries, like entertainment and technology were more in favour of the GDPR than 
not. In fact, these industries are more aligned with the likes of diffuse interest groups (like NGOs 
and consumer protection groups) than other industries that are highly susceptible to date 
breaches.  
The defence of the status quo levelled by finance and retail was ultimately counterbalanced by 
considerable lobbying efforts to change the status quo. We also saw important differences at the 
country-level, where former ‘late compliers’ became, on balance, proponents of the GDPR. 
Moreover, this push in support of the GDPR was coming from a heterogeneous group of 
concentrated interest groups and sectors as well as diffuse interests. Taking all of these factors 
together, the EU’s success in passing the GDRP may well have been helped along by strong 
lobbying efforts from the right mix of actors and from the right countries.  
 
Conclusions 
Our analysis examines how interest group preferences align on different sides of lobbying 
battles. Taking the GPDR as our case, we assessed how preference alignment is a function of 
industry-specific costs related to regulatory change. In the case of the GDRP, industries most 
susceptible to increasing costs and to potential data breaches inviting substantial fines for non-
compliance are therefore highly incentivised to lobby against the new GDPR rules. Our 
approach advances on current research that tends to explain preferences and preference 
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alignment either in terms of country-specific institutional context or interest group type. Our 
explanation tempers expectations that preferences are circumscribed by national borders and 
also offers a more nuanced perspective to studies that focus on the blunt distinction between 
concentrated and diffuse interest groups.  
 Regression analysis presents some support for our argument. Specifically, we find that 
groups representing the interests of the financial and retail sectors are more likely to oppose 
the GDPR and to level a strong defence of the status quo. These same trends, however, do not 
extend to other sectors sensitive to GDPR costs, namely technology and entertainment. At the 
same time, we do find sustained lobbying efforts by a heterogeneous group of interests in 
support of the GDPR. Hence, despite resistance of finance and retail, lobbying on the GDPR did 
much more to support its passing into EU law than to weaken or oppose it.  
 The question of preference alignment is underpinned by broader questions of interest 
group influence. These, however, are not explored in the present analysis. Ultimately, however, 
empirical research could take up the more explicit task of directly assessing interest group 
influence over the GDPR. Answering this question could build on our dataset, using our coding 
on lobbying demands for a weaker or stronger regime as a proxy for interest group preferences. 
This approach to measuring influence, and using consultation data to this end, is already well-
established in the existing interest group literature (see Klüver, 2013) and would provide a 
prudent approach for future research.  
Additionally, such a consideration of influence might well include an analysis of how 
interest groups use framing to affect policy outcomes. Recent research examines the framing 
processes through which interest groups attempt to draw attention to their preferred frames on 
a policy issue and thus away from those of rivals. Framing processes have been widely studied 
in the public opinion and social movements literatures (e.g. Atikcan, 2015; Benford et al., 2000; 
Chong et al., 2007a, 2007b; Entman, 2004; Goffman, 1974; McAdam et al., 1996; Polletta et al., 
2006; Soroka, 2006; Tarrow, 1998) as well as the interest group literature (Klüver et al., 
forthcoming). Detailed research designs, mostly on EU environmental and transport policy, 
 24 
demonstrate that policymakers are indeed influenced by the most effective framers 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009; Boräng et al., 2014; Klüver et al., forthcoming; Mahoney, 2008). Our 
dataset, derived from consultation data, could be extended to code for these framing processes. 
Different players emphasize different aspects of data protection. For instance, in our 
consultation data, while Skype frames the data protection issue mostly around the sub-issues of 
technological innovation and the risk of inflexibility, Facebook puts the emphasis on the 
development of their personalized privacy policy. Indeed, a more complete picture of influence 
would consider interest groups’ framing strategies along with an analysis of how demands and 
resources are aligned on different ‘sides’ of the GDPR.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
Table 1: Interest Groups by Economic Activity 
ISIC Division N % 
Activities of membership organizations 65 17.24 
Telecommunications 41 10.88 
Social work activities without accommodation 40 10.61 
Advertising and market research 29 7.69 
Publishing activities 26 6.9 
Legal and accounting activities 24 6.37 
Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding 21 5.57 
Information service activities 16 4.24 
Scientific research and development 16 4.24 
Motion picture, video & television programme production, sound recording & music 
publishing activities 14 3.71 
Human health activities 13 3.45 
Programming and broadcasting activities 10 2.65 
Office administrative, office support and other business support activities 10 2.65 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 9 2.39 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 9 2.39 
Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security 8 2.12 
Activities auxiliary to financial service and insurance activities 5 1.33 
Air transport 4 1.06 
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 4 1.06 
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products 3 0.8 
Travel agency, tour operator, reservation service and related activities 3 0.8 
Education 2 0.53 
Postal and courier activities 1 0.27 
Real estate activities 1 0.27 
Creative, arts and entertainment activities 1 0.27 
Gambling and betting activities 1 0.27 
Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities 1 0.27 
Total 
27
7 100 
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Table 2. Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Interest Group Preferences  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline 
National 
institutions 
Interest group 
type 
Sector-specific 
costs 
Complete 
model 
Late compliers  4.378*   4.511* 
  (3.070)   (3.134) 
Safe harbour  0.775   0.860 
  (0.622)   (0.726) 
Concentrated interest 
groups 
  0.152*  0.261 
   (0.120)  (0.220) 
Diffuse interest groups   0.273  0.333 
   (0.289)  (0.352) 
Finance    0.117*** 0.168** 
    (0.0711) (0.105) 
Retail    0.0808* 0.110* 
    (0.0826) (0.114) 
Technology    0.517 0.912 
    (0.265) (0.494) 
Entertainment    1.307 1.697 
    (1.195) (1.561) 
      
Control variables      
Public Salience 1.012 1.004 1.010 1.006 0.996 
 (0.0114) (0.00890) (0.0114) (0.0129) (0.0104) 
Staff 1.043 1.043 1.039 1.073 1.075 
 (0.0339) (0.0334) (0.0326) (0.0407) (0.0415) 
National-level interests 0.653 0.697 0.650 0.650 0.756 
 (0.302) (0.305) (0.303) (0.338) (0.366) 
European-level interests 0.131** 0.132** 0.153** 0.179* 0.181* 
 (0.0885) (0.0865) (0.104) (0.122) (0.121) 
      
Cut 1 -6.77 -6.65 -8.52 -7.91 -8.77 
 (1.38) (1.26) (1.59) (1.55) (1.60) 
Cut 2 -2.29 -2.22 -3.98 -2.99 -3.92 
 (0.94) (0.77) (1.21) (1.12) (1.19) 
Log likelihood -104.00 -102.23 -99.71 -93.73 -90.35 
Observations 204 204 204 203 203 
Notes: Odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 1. Effects of Late Compliers on Lobbying Preferences 
Notes. Based on estimations in model 2. Markers depict the marginal effects on the dependent variable. 
Vertical lines depict the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 2. Effects of Concentrated interest groups on Lobbying Preferences 
Notes. Based on estimations in model 3. Markers depict the marginal effects on the dependent variable. 
Vertical lines depict the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3. Effects of Sector-specific costs on Lobbying Preferences.  
Notes. Based on estimations in model 4. Markers depict the marginal effects on the dependent variable. 
Vertical lines depict the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 4. Mean Lobbying Preferences across Sectors and Concentrated and Diffuse Interests. 
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Table A1. Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Lobbying preferences 2.67 0.56 1 3 
Public Salience 80.25 30.71 0 95 
National interests .51 .50 0 1 
European interests .75 .43 0 1 
Staff 7.99 14.79 1 140 
Late compliers 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Safe Harbour 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Concentrated interest groups 0.45 0.49 0 1 
Diffuse interest groups 0.05 0.05 0 1 
Finance 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Retail 0.02 0.28 0 1 
Entertainment 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Technology 0.13 0.33 0 1 
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Table A2. Interest Groups Types 
Type N % 
Individuals 271 49.27 
Trade, business & professional associations  160 29.09 
Companies & groups  57 10.36 
NGOs 35 6.36 
Trade unions  12 1.09 
Law firms  4 1.09 
Think tanks and research institutions  4 0.73 
Professional consultancies  3 0.73 
Public authorities 2 0.55 
Other public or mixed entities, etc.  2 0.36 
Total 550 100 
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Table A3. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the 
Determinants of Interest Group Preferences 
 
 
 Logistic Regression Multinomial Regression 
 
 
(1) 
Status Quo 
(2) 
Less stringency 
(3) 
Late compliers 4.052* 0.272* 6.43e-11 
 (2.227) (0.152) (0.000) 
Safe harbour 0.905 1.075 6.39432e+09 
 (0.745) (0.891) (9.57457e+13) 
Concentrated interest 0.272 7.494 0.000 
 (0.224) (8.142) (0.000613) 
Diffuse interests  0.341 5.885 598.4 
 (0.348) (7.311) (4711310.7) 
Finance 0.167** 5.922** 2.60273e+12 
 (0.101) (3.618) (2.60330e+16) 
Retail 0.0890* 11.48* 14.90 
 (0.0970) (13.04) (237858.6) 
Technology 0.947 1.046 18703853.6 
 (0.483) (0.537) (3.37320e+11) 
Entertainment 1.522 0.684 2.44e-08 
 (1.365) (0.618) (0.000) 
Public salience 0.995 1.003 0.959 
 (0.00927) (0.00971) (115.9) 
Staff 1.070 0.935 0.001 
 (0.0390) (0.0341) (0.863) 
National-level interest 0.915 0.955 2.16672e+09 
 (0.382) (0.408) (7.68550e+12) 
European-level interest 0.167** 9.124** 1.28e-10 
 (0.108) (6.650) (0.000) 
    
N 203 203 203 
Model 1: Odds ration with Standard errors in parentheses;  
Models 2 and 3: Relative risk ratios with Standard errors in parentheses; reference category is 3 (support for 
GDPR); category 1 (preferences for less stringency omitted) 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table A3 presents the results for two robustness tests. The first uses a re-coded version of our 
dependent variable, where 0 = preference for less stringent regulation as well as preference for 
retaining the status quo, and 1 = preference for the GDPR. As our dependent variable is, in this case, 
binary we use logistic regression analysis in Model 1. The second robustness test uses our original 
three categories for Lobbying preferences (1 = preference for less stringent regulation (N= 21), 2 = 
preference for retaining the status quo (N= 94), and 3 = preference for the GDPR (N= 309) but in the 
context of multinomial logistic regression. Doing so relaxes the ordinality assumption of the 
regression analyses presented in our main analysis.2 Models 2 and 3 present the results for the 
comparison categories ‘preference for less stringent regulation’ (model 2) and ‘preference for 
retaining the status quo’ (model 3), with the reference category being ‘preferences for the GDPR’. 
Some of the results in model 3 are exceedingly large and call into the question the validity of these 
findings. This might be the result of this particular category being too small for comparison with the 
reference category. Moreover, it is important to note that none of the results in Model 3 are 
statistically significant. We did attempt to re-run these models taking ‘preference for less stringent 
regulation’ as the reference category, but the regression estimations did not converge. Nevertheless, 
                                                             
2 We would like to thank the Editor for this recommendation.  
 36 
our main point of interest is the comparison made in Model 2, between preference for the status quo 
and preference for the GDPR. We will focus on this particular comparison.  
Both robustness test give support to our central findings. Model 1, where the results are 
presented as odds ratios, clearly shows that Finance and Retail are less likely to support the GDPR 
and more likely to support either retaining the status quo or opting for even less stringent regulation. 
Results for Late compliers and European-level interest are also consistent with our main analysis.  
Results in Models 2 are presented as relative risk ratios of the coefficients, indicating ‘how 
the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group compared to the risk of the outcome falling in 
the reference group changes with the each variable in question’.3 Relative risk ratios greater than 1 
indicate an increase in the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group relative to the reference 
group, and ratios less than 1 the opposite. The most important findings presented in the table above 
relate to our main argument about industry-specific costs. Consistent with our main analysis, these 
results suggest that Finance and Retail are more likely to fall into the category ‘preference for the 
status quo’ compared to the reference category ‘preference for the GDPR’. Specially, when 
comparing organisations from the Finance to other industries, the relative risk of organisations 
supporting the status quo increases by a factor of about 6 compared to support the GDPR. For Retail, 
this increase is by a factor of 13. A with model 1, the results for Late compliers and European-level 
interests in model 2 are consistent with the results presented in our main analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
3 https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/output/multinomial-logistic-regression/ 
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Figure A1. Distribution of Interest Groups by Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3. Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Finance Retail Technology Entertainment Diffuse Concentrated 
Late 
compliers 
Safe 
harbour 
Public 
Salience Staff 
National 
interest 
European 
interests 
Finance 1 
           
Retail -0.05 1 
          
Technology -0.12 -0.06 1 
         
Entertainment -0.08 -0.04 -0.1 1 
        
Diffuse -0.06 -0.05 -0.11 -0.08 1 
       
Concentrated 0.2 0.11 0.28 0.08 -0.22 1 
      
Late  compliers -0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.01 1 
     
Safe habor -0.03 0.12 -0.02 -0.01 0 0.13 -0.07 1 
    
Public salience 0.01 -0.2 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 0.22 -0.05 1 
   
Staff 0.28 -0.04 -0.11 -0.09 0.09 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.07 1 
  
National interests 0.09 -0.05 -0.04 0 0.02 -0.11 0.29 -0.04 0.23 0.05 1 
 
European interests 0.13 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.08 0.13 -0.06 0.39 0.11 0.42 1 
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 5 
Endnotes 
                                                             
i In the context of the United States, for instance,  ‘study after study has concluded that the vast majority of 
lobbyists in Washington are employed by business and the majority of campaign contributions are from 
interest group coming from business’ (Coen, Grant, & Wilson (2010), p.10; see also Gray & Lowery 1997; 
Baumgartner et al., 2009). 
ii This design choice also marks an advance on Bunea (2015), which examines coordinated lobbying in 
European Commission open consultations with a focus on five distinct policy events spanning the period 
2003 to 2008.  
iii  Another example of a highly lobbied EC proposal would be the 2003 ‘Registration, Evaluation, and 
Authorization of Chemicals’ Regulation (REACH) (see Persson, 2007). 
iv All consultation data are gathered from the DG Justice website (http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/opinion/index_en.htm (accessed 30/7/2015))  
v The Commission also routinely consults interest group via various conferences and public hearings. 
These consultations are excluded from this analysis insofar as there are no data on interest group 
participation.   
vi Since there was no standard format for all three consultations we were unable to code in a way to 
capture the multidimensionality of GDPR sub-issues. Hence, we opted to code preferences at the level of 
each individual submission. This approach is consistent Young and Pagiliari (2014). 
vii The Breach Level Index can be found here: http://breachlevelindex.com/ (accessed 27.1.2018) 
viii The list also includes government / public authorities (13%). Given our focus, these actors are not 
included in this study. The index also has a ‘Other’ category for all other sectors (21%). 
ix This approach to coding is consistent with a growing body of research, including the Intereuro project 
(Beyers et al. 2014). 
x The Safe Harbour list can be found here: https://tresorit.com/safe-harbor 
xi Information on the transposition of the 1995 directive can be found here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/law/status-implementation/index_en.htm 
xii The European Commission Transparency Register is available online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do (accessed 30/7/2015). 
xiii European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 359, Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic 
Identity in the EU, June 2011. The report can be found here: 
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/data/dataset/S864_74_3_EBS359 
xiv We would like to thank the Editor for this important suggestion. 
xv The mentioned consultation documents can be found here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/opinion/101104_en.htm 
xvi The mentioned consultation documents can be found here:  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/opinion/101104_en.htm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
